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Introduction
In 1995, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") decision in Union
Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association ASBL v. Bosman 1 rocked the
European football 2 community.3 The ECJ held that the transfer fee system 4
and rules limiting the number of foreign players a club could field violated
Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome, 5 which regulates the freedom of move-
ment of workers within the European Community ("EC").6 In one fell
1. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociot~s de Football Assoc. ASBL v. Bos-
man, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 645 (1995).
2. In this Note, "football" carries its British meaning; in America it would be called
soccer. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1810 (2d ed. 2001).
3. See Morning Edition: European Court Reverses Limit on Foreign Soccer Trades
(National Public Radio broadcast, May 21, 1996).
4. The European transfer fee system was, in essence, an organized market for lower-
level clubs to sell their best players to teams playing on a higher level. See Patrick Clos-
son, Penalty Shot: The European Union's Application of Competition Law to the Bosman
Ruling, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 167, 176 (1998). At the time of Bosman, if a player
rejected the offer made by his club and his name was placed on the "transfer list," and if
a different club wished to add that player to their team, the new club would have to pay a
"transfer fee" to the old club. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at para. 9, at 1-4934, [1996] 1
C.M.L.R. at para. 9, at 654 (1995) (Lenz, Advocate General). The amount of the transfer
fee varied, depending on whether the transfer was classified as a "compulsory trans-
fer[ ]" or a "free transfer[ ]." Id. Compulsory transfers were those that took place
between May 1st and May 30th. Id. During this period, a player could be acquired by a
new club without his old club's consent; however, the acquiring club had to pay a set
premium, ranging between two and fourteen times a player's gross annual income,
depending on the player's age. Id. If the player was not acquired by May 30, the "free
transfer" period commenced, lasting until June 25th. Id. During this period, a new
team could acquire the player, but first had to negotiate a transfer fee with the old club.
If, by June 25th, the player remained untransferred, his old club had to reinstate the
offer that the player had rejected before the compulsory transfer period. If the player
rejected that offer again, the team had two options: It could suspend him, or it could
release him. Id. The concern of the Union of European Football Associations (U.E.F.A.)
was that "smaller clubs and the system of developing young talent would be destroyed" if
the transfer fee system was abolished, because "small clubs were kept afloat by the
money which filtered down to them from the large clubs as compensation for training
and developing younger players." Id.
5. TRATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
48, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 36 [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. Article 48 states the following, in
relevant part:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by
the end of the transitional period at the latest. 2. Such freedom of movement
shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between
workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other
conditions of work and employment."
Id.
6. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at para. 53, at 1-5081, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 53, at 778;
see EEC TREATY, art. 48.
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swoop, the ECJ effectively abolished a transfer fee system that had been in
use for over one hundred years.
7
The fallout from the decision was tumultuous, with the Union of Euro-
pean Football Associations ("U.E.F.A.") effectively refusing to recognize the
decision.8 Instead, the U.E.F.A. maintained both its transfer fee system and
its restrictive foreign player limitations.9 This recalcitrance brought about
an exchange of threats between Community officials and football's gov-
erning bodies, the most viable being European Union ("EU") Commis-
sioner of Competition Karl Van Miert's formal warning letter to fine the
U.E.F.A. for violating EU competition laws. 10
This turmoil continued until March 5, 2001, when Mario Monti, the
new head of the EU Competition Committee, and Sepp Blatter, head of the
Federation Internationale de Football Association ("F.I.F.A."), football's
international governing body, came to an agreement that would retain
many portions of the transfer system, while bringing it in line with EU
law." In its most basic form, the new system replaced the transfer fee with
"solidarity mechanisms that would redistribute a significant proportion of
income to clubs involved in the training and education of a player," and
provided for "[clompensation ... if a contract is breached unilaterally," but
imposed no restrictions on free movement for players once their contracts
had expired. 12 In other words, it signaled the end of the "reserve system"
that enabled clubs to lock in players perpetually1 3 and ushered in an era of
free agency. 14 The agreement also allowed clubs to employ as many play-
ers from EU Member States as they desired but retained foreign player
restrictions for players who were not EU nationals.
15
While complaints about the system abounded, 16 the system itself
7. See Peter N. Katz, Comment, A History of Free Agency in the United States and
Great Britain: Who's Leading the Charge?, 15 CoMP. LA L.J. 371, 401-02 (1994) ("By
the 1890s, each player usually had a price put on their heads which interested clubs
would be expected to pay.").
8. See Martin Thrope, Premier League May By-Pass "Unjust" UEFA, GuARDIAN
(London), Jan. 16, 1996, at 20 (noting U.E.F.A.'s "muddled response to the Bosman rul-
ing" and reporting that "[tihe [European] Commission... has been annoyed at what it
sees as [U.E.F.A.]'s obstructive and unhelpful stance on Bosman").
9. See Ronald Shepherd, England To Defy UEFA, DAILY MAIL (London), Jan. 17,
1996, at 77.
10. See Julie Wolf, EC Threatens Ruling Bodies with Fines, GuARDIAN (London), Jan.
20, 1996, at 18.
11. John Goodbody, Transfer Deal Struck as Football Falls in Line with EU, TIMES
(London), Mar. 6, 2001, at 36; see Biography of Mario Monti, at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/commissioners/monti/cven.html (last modified Jan. 12, 2003).
12. Ian Paul, Agreement Reached over Transfer System, HERALD (Glasgow), Mar. 6,
2001, at 33, 36; see Goodbody, supra note 11.
13. A "reserve system" enables management to bind a player to one team by exercis-
ing an option to retain the player despite the expiration of his initial contract. Cf. BENJA-
MIN G. RADER, BASEBALL: A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S GAME 63 (2002) (describing the
operation of a reserve clause in American baseball players' contracts).
14. See Goodbody, supra note 11.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., id. (quoting FIFPro (European Players' Union) Spokesman Laurent
Denis, as saying, "We don't accept this accord. It's a very black day. It creates a new
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appeared as if it might remain in force. Then came the French Conseil
d'Etat's decision in Federation FranCaise de Basket-Ball,I7 where the court
ruled that the French foreign player restrictions were discriminatory as
applied to the players of twenty-four non-EU nations that had signed work-
ing agreements' 8 with the EU. 19 Worried about player labor flooding the
European leagues and destroying any form of "national identities," Blatter
stated, "The Malaja ruling combined with the admission of [ten] more
members in the EU in 2004 is a Bosman case multiplied by a million."'20
However, the ECJ would soon concur with the Malaja ruling in Deutscher
Handballbund e.V. v. Kolpak 21 and suggest that free player movement
could be extended to as many as forty-four other nations.22 To say the
least, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to how quickly Europe can
absorb the flood of changes descending upon its international transfer
system.
Meanwhile, in the United States, baseball has undergone similar bat-
tles since the early part of the twentieth century.23 In response to worries
of losing players with no compensation and escalating transfer costs,
Branch Rickey, at the time general manager of the St. Louis Cardinals, 2 4
created the wholly-owned "farm system."'25 In 1975, Andy Messersmith 2 6
challenged baseball's owners and won an arbitration decision that ended
baseball's "reserve system."'2 7 Notably, in contrast to Europe's fears that
increased player autonomy would precipitate the collapse of competitive
sports, the post-1975 free agency era has seen Major League Baseball
category of workers . . . who will not benefit like others from the same social
protection.").
17. Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 30, 2002, Lebon 2002, 485 (Fr.).
18. The agreement in the instant case was the Association Agreement between the
EU and Poland signed in 1991 and effective since 1994. Id.; Ivan Speck, Polish Case
Could Spell New Danger, DAILY MAIL (London), Jan. 11, 1999, at 64.
19. Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 30, 2002, Lebon at 485.
20. Francois Thomazeau, Blatter Fears over "New Bosman" Ruling, ESPN Soccernet,
at http://soccernet.espn.go.com/headlinenews?id=255435&cc=5901 (Jan. 20, 2003).
21. Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund e.V. v. Kolpak, 2003 E.C.R. 1-4135
(2003).
22. See id.
23. See RADER, supra note 13, at 144-47 (describing how minor league baseball
franchises evolved from "enterprises shaped by their own ends" to "agencies for the
development of big league players").
24. See id. at 143-45. Rickey would go on to be president and general manager of
the Brooklyn and Los Angeles Dodgers and organize Jackie Robinson's quest to break
baseball's color barrier. See id. at 155-56; see also Rickey, (Wesley) Branch, MSN
Encarta, at http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761565762/BranchRickey.html (last
visited Nov. 28, 2004).
25. See RADER, supra note 13, at 144-45, 147-49. A farm system is a collection of
baseball clubs structured so that a "major league baseball club exercises control by
means of either stock ownership or contract, over the activities of several minor league
clubs .... " LIONEL S. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 21 (1977).
26. At the time, Andy Messersmith was a star pitcher for the Los Angeles Dodgers
and wanted to capitalize financially on his recent success. See ROGER I. ABRAMs, LEGAL
BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 117-18 (1998).
27. See id.
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expanding from a twenty-four-team to a thirty-team league, 28 per-game
attendance increasing from 15,403 in 1975 to 30,401 in 2003,29 thus
almost doubling, and baseball's competitive balance remaining generally
unaffected.30
The purpose of this Note is to suggest that, in the wake of the turmoil
created by Bosman, Malaja, and Handballbund, F.I.F.A. and the U.E.F.A.
should look to baseball for a solution. Baseball's farm system and the suc-
cess surrounding the sport's termination of the reserve system may provide
a model for moving European football out of the perceived chaos created by
the ECJ.
Part I of this Note examines the international transfer system and the
decisions that have begun to dismantle it. Part 1I examines baseball's bat-
tles with and solutions to many of the transfer system's "problems." Part III
examines the feasibility of implementing baseball's solutions in European
football. Part IV is a conclusion.
I. Free Agency in European Football?
A. An Introduction to the International Transfer System
The origins of the international transfer system lie in the very begin-
nings of English professional football.3 1 In 1863, a band of English ama-
teur football clubs known as the Football Association ("F.A.") began to set
up a uniform set of rules and regulations to govern what would become
England's first professional football league. 32 One of these rules was the
"Retain and Transfer Rule. ' 33 The Rule's essence was that "[a]fter a
player's contract had expired, an option period, controlled exclusively by
the club, began."'34 During the option period, the club could resign the
player at a compensation level at least commensurate to his previous con-
tract or could place the player on the transfer list.35 Other teams could
sign players off the transfer list but had to reimburse the former club.36
The transfer system was a response to fears that smaller market clubs
would be unable to compete with larger market clubs for top players.37 In
theory, at the end of a star player's contact, large market clubs, for example
28. Major League Expansion History, at http://www.worldzone.net/sports/baseball/
expansion.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2004).
29. See Kenn Tomasch, MLB Attendance, at http://www.kenn.com/sports/baseball/
mlb/ml-numbers.html (last modified Dec. 14, 2003); Baseball Sets Record for Total
Attendance with Third-Highest Average, Yahoo Sports, at http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/
news?slug=ap-attendance&provwap&type=lgns (Oct. 3, 2004).
30. Peter Fishman, Competitive Balance and Free Agency in Major League Baseball, 14
DUKE J. EcON. 4, 4-5 (2002), at http://www.econ.duke.edu/Journals/DJE/dje2002/
fishman.pdf.
31. Katz, supra note 7, at 401-02.
32. Id. at 397-98.
33. Id. at 401-02.
34. Id. at 401.
35. Id. at 401-02.
36. Id. at 402.
37. Id.
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Manchester United, would be able to outbid any small market club for that
player. 38 As the large market clubs began to acquire all of the most tal-
ented players, parity within the league would evaporate, leaving only a few
competitive clubs.3 9 Just as the "eat-what-you-kill" mentality within
England's business environment of the mid-nineteenth century was being
replaced by calls for the government to reduce economic inequality, restric-
tions on player movement were thought to promote a competitive balance,
which was in the interests of the F.A., football, and sport itself.40 By
requiring the option period at the end of all contracts, the F.A. created a
system where small market teams that were able to develop top players
could retain those players (or at least be compensated for them), and there-
fore compete with large market teams despite their smaller budgets.41
As the game began to internationalize, the F.A. further restricted player
movement by maintaining limits on the number of foreign players that any
single club could have on its roster.42 Other national football associations
also adopted foreign player limit rules so that by 1995, all F.I.F.A. members
employed some sort of foreign player restriction 43 in an attempt to preserve
parity throughout the international game.44
B. Early Challenges to the Transfer System
1. Eastham v. Newcastle Football Club 45
In Eastham, a professional British football player sued his club and the
F.A., seeking a declaration that the retention and transfer system did not
apply to him because the system was an unlawful restraint of trade.46 After
a careful examination of the system, the chancery division held that the
retention provisions became operational only after the termination of a
player's employment and did not, as the owners argued, function like the
exercise of an employer's option triggering the continuation of employ-
38. See id.
39. See A. Craig Copetas & Stefan Fatsic, Pitch Battle: Soccer's Lords Take on Free-
Market Forces: Suits over Player Transfers May Dictate Who Really Runs the Sport, WALL
ST. J. EUR.,July 28, 1997, at 10; cf. Rachel B. Arnedt, Comment, European Union Law and
Football Nationality Restrictions: The Economics and Politics of the Bosman Decision, 12
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1091, 1111 (1998) (noting that European nationality restrictions
were born out of "[t]he desire to avoid lopsided, uninteresting games" that would occur
"[i]f any two clubs are drastically unevenly matched").
40. See Arnedt, supra note 39, at 1111; Henry Mather, Natural Law and Liberalism,
52 S.C. L. REv. 331, 353 (2001).
41. See Mather, supra note 40, at 353; James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle over
European Football's Transfer System, 56 MiAMi L. REv. 667, 669 (2002).
42. See Mather, supra note 40, at 405.
43. See Jon S. Greenwood, What Major League Baseball Can Learn from Its Interna-
tional Counterparts: Building a Model Collective Bargaining Agreement for Major League
Baseball, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 581, 606 (1995).
44. See Copetas & Fatsic, supra note 39. The arguments supporting restrictions on
the number of foreign players are similar to those justifying limitations on club size. See
supra notes 37-41.
45. Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd., [1964] 1 Ch. 413 (Eng. 1963).
46. See id. at 415.
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ment.4 7 Therefore, the retention provisions interfered with the player's
right to seek employment and were, accordingly, void as a restraint of
trade.48 However, the court held that apart from the retention provisions,
the transfer system in itself did not constitute a restraint on trade because
two mitigating factors were present:4
9
First, [the player] can appeal to the management committee if he thinks the
[transfer] fee is excessive, and he may get a free transfer[.] [S]econdly, pro-
vided he complies with the association's rules as to transfer-which make no
mention of fees-he may transfer to a club outside the league without any fee
being paid. 5
0
Thus, although certain features of the transfer system had taken a beating,
the system itself survived to see another day.
2. DonA v. Mantero51
The players attacked the transfer system on a different front in Dond.
Here, the European Court of Justice considered whether Articles 7,52 48,53
and 5954 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
47. See id. at 430.
48. See id. at 430-31.
49. See id. at 431.
50. Id.
51. Case C-13/76, DonA v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578
(1976).
52. Article 7 states:
Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on the grounds of
nationality shall be prohibited.
The Council may, on a proposal from the Commission and in cooperation with
the European Parliament, adopt, by a qualified majority, rules designed to pro-
hibit such discrimination.
EEC TREATY, art. 7.
53. Article 48 states:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community
by the end of the transitional period at the latest.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance
with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed
in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in imple-
menting regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public
service.
Id. art. 48.
54. Article 59 states:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to
provide services within the Community shall be progressively abolished during
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("EEC Treaty") conferred the right to provide a service anywhere in the
European Community upon nationals of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Community."5 The Court found that Articles 48 through 51 and 59
through 6656 provide for freedom of movement and call for the abolition of
any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member
States as regards employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work
and employment.5 7 The Court next took up the question of whether the
provisions of the EEC Treaty should apply to football players.5 8 In answer-
ing this question, the Court held that sports are subject to Community law
only insofar as they constitute an economic activity (as opposed to recrea-
tional entertainment) within the meaning of Article 259 of the EEC
Treaty. 60 The Court then held that the activities of professional or
semiprofessional football players were economic activity because the play-
ers' services constituted gainful employment or remunerated service.
6 1
But despite the ECJ's clear rejection of discriminatory sports policies, Dona
turned out to be little more than a paper tiger: Although the EC passed
resolutions in support of the decision on three separate occasions, the F.A.
and other football associations largely ignored the decision and continued
to restrict the number of foreign players a team could field for a given
match. 62
the transitional period in respect of nationals of Member States who are estab-
lished in a State of the Community other than that of the person for whom the
services are intended.
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Com-
mission, extend the provisions of the chapter to nationals of a third country who
provide services and who are established within the community.
Id. art. 59.
55. See Dona, 1976 E.C.R. at paras. 2, 6-11, at 1339-40, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at paras.
2, 6-8, at 585-86.
56. EEC TREATY, arts. 48-51, 59-66.
57. See Dona, 1976 E.C.R. at paras. 6-11, at 1339-40, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at paras.
6-8, at 586.
58. See id., 1976 E.C.R. at paras. 2, 12-16, at 1338, 1340, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at
paras. 2, 9-10, at 585-87.
59. Article 2 states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activ-
ities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an
accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the
States belonging to it.
EEC TREATY, art. 2.
60. See Dona, 1976 E.C.R. at paras. 12-14, at 1340, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at
paras.9-10, at 586-87.
61. See id. However, the court did make special exceptions to allow professional
football players to play for national teams. See id., 1976 E.C.R. at para. 20, at 1344,
[1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at paras. 17, at 581-82 (opinion of Trabucchi, Advocate General).
62. Katz, supra note 7, at 406. The U.E.F.A. permitted each national association to
limit the number of foreign players a club could field in any first division match, to
three-plus two foreign players who had served at least five consecutive years in the
nation, including three as a junior. See id. at 409 & n.244.
Vol. 38
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3. Union Royale Belge des Socift~s de Football Association ASBL v.
Bosman 6 3
Between 1988 and 1990, Jean-Marc Bosman, a Belgian national, played
professionally for RC Liege, a Belgium first division club.64 In 1990, Liege
offered Bosman a new contract that reduced his salary by seventy-five per-
cent.65 Bosman refused to sign the contract and the club placed him on the
transfer list,6 6 setting his transfer fee at 11,743,000 Belgium Francs
(BFR),6 7 based on his training costs.6 8
Bosman passed through the compulsory transfer period unclaimed
and arranged a contract with US Dunkerque, a French club, as was his
right as a nonclaimed player.6 9 The contract called for US Dunkerque to
pay a transfer fee of BFR 1,200,00070 to RC Liege.7 1 Doubting US Dunker-
que's solvency, Liege refused the transfer fee and suspended Bosman,
preventing him from playing the entire season.72
In 1992, Bosman brought suit against Liege and the U.E.F.A. seeking a
declaration that the transfer rules and nationality clauses violated the EEC
Treaty. 73 Unable to resolve the case without an official interpretation of
the Treaty, the Belgian Cour d'Appel asked the ECJ to determine whether
Articles 48, 85, and 86 "prohibit[ed] a football club from requiring and
receiving payment of a sum of money upon the engagement of one of its
players who has come to the end of his contract by a new employing
club."7 4 The Cour d'Appel also asked whether Articles 48, 85, and 86 "pro-
hibit[ed] the national and international sporting associations or federa-
tions from including in their respective regulations provisions restricting
access of foreign players from the European Community to the competi-
tions which they organize." 75
The ECJ held that the transfer system was a barrier to freedom of
movement and therefore a violation of Article 48.76 Reiterating that "free-
dom of movement for workers is one of the fundamental principles of the
63. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, [19961 1 C.M.L.R. 645.
64. See id., 1995 E.C.R. at para. 28, at 1-5050, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 28, at 759.
65. Id., 1995 E.C.R. at paras. 28-29, at 1-5050, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at paras. 28-29, at
759.
66. Id.
67. Approximately $386,933. See The Universal Currency Converter, at http://
www.xe.com/ucc/ (conversion performed on Nov. 27, 2004).
68. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at para. 29, at 1-5050, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 29, at
759.
69. Id., 1995 E.C.R. at para. 30, at 1-5050-51, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 30, at 759;
see discussion of the transfer fee system, supra notes 4, 32-36 and accompanying text.
70. Approximately $39,535. See The Universal Currency Converter, supra note 67
(conversion performed on Nov. 27, 2004).
71. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at para. 31, at 1-5051, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 31, at
759.
72. Id., 1995 E.C.R. at para. 33, at 1-5051, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 33, at 759.
73. Id., 1995 E.C.R. at para. 40, at 1-5053, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 40, at 760-61.
74. Id., 1995 E.C.R. at para. 49, at 1-5056, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 49, at 762.
75. Id.
76. Id., 1995 E.C.R. at paras. 92-104, at 1-5068-71, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at paras.
92-104, at 770-72.
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Community," the Court held that the transfer fee system violated that prin-
ciple by providing an unfair advantage to a player's present team.
7 7
According to the Court's reasoning, it was against the spirit of the EEC
Treaty to legitimate a system wherein all potential employers interested in
enlisting the services of a worker no longer under contract must pay a
substantial fee to that worker's most recent employer, when the latter could
re-sign him for no cost above that of his salary.7 8
The ECJ next addressed the applicability of Article 48 to rules limiting
the number of foreign players a football team may field for a match.79 It
noted that Article 48 prohibits discrimination based on nationality
"between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remunera-
tion, and conditions of work and employment."'80 In accord with its deci-
sion in Dond, the Court recognized that while there was no absolute
restriction on foreign players, rules preventing teams from fielding more
than three such players for any match significantly limited a player's
employment opportunities and thus constituted unlawful discrimination. 8 1
Eliminating the nationality restrictions, the Court held, would increase the
opportunity for employment by creating a larger market.
8 2
In reaching its holding, the Court dismissed the U.E.F.A.'s
noneconomic grounds for applying foreign player restrictions. 83 Making
arguments that would be echoed in years to come, the U.E.F.A. claimed
that foreign player restrictions were needed (1) to field a team representa-
tive of the local population, (2) to develop a local pool of talent from which
the national team could be selected, and (3) to maintain a competitive bal-
ance between the clubs.84 The Court countered (1) that the protection of
nationalism as a means of "enabling the public to identify with its favourite
team" was nonsensical given the absence of similar provisions ensuring
proportional representation of residents hailing from a team's "locality,
town, region or... territory"; (2) that football clubs already employed for-
eign players without compromising their eligibility for their respective
national teams; and (3) that restrictions on foreign players had no effect on
the competitive balance because wealthier clubs routinely used their finan-
cial clout to attract premier domestic players, thereby undermining the
77. Id., 1995 E.C.R. at paras. 93, 100-01, at 1-5068, 1-5070, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at
paras. 93, 100-01, at 770-71.
78. See id., 1995 E.C.R. at paras. 100-01, at 1-5070, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at paras.
100-01, at 771.
79. See id., 1995 E.C.R. at paras. 115-37, at 1-5073-78, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at paras.
115-37, at 773-76.
80. See id., 1995 E.C.R. at para. 117, at 1-5074, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 117, at
774.
81. See id., 1995 E.C.R. at paras. 127-29, at 1-5076, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at paras.
127-29, at 775.
82. See id., 1995 E.C.R. at para. 134, at 1-5077, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 134, at
776.
83. See id., 1995 E.C.R. at paras. 121-37, at 1-5075-78, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at paras.
121-37, at 774-76.
84. See id., 1995 E.C.R. at paras. 123-25, at 1-5075, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at paras.
123-25, at 774.
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argument that the interests of parity necessitated nationality restrictions.8 5
In short, the Bosman judgment means that "when a player's contract
expires he is free" to sign with any club and in any country he desires.8 6 In
practice though, the immediate effect is that clubs pressure players into
signing long, multiyear contracts so that they may control the players'
rights for their entire career even without a reserve clause to fall back on.
8 7
C. The Transfer System Lives On
1. The Turmoil over Enforcing Bosman
Following the Bosman ruling, the Competition Committee made clear
that it firmly intended to use its powers to ensure that the principles spelt
out in the Court's judgment were respected.8 8 Thus, a month after Bosman,
the Committee informed F.I.F.A. and the U.E.F.A. in writing that the EC
would not exempt the international transfer system from EU law.8 9 Fur-
ther, the Committee declined to exempt the restriction on the number of
foreign players in national and international club competitions (the so-
called three-plus-two rule90 ).9 1
But changes to the transfer system were not forthcoming.9 2 In the
beginning, F.I.F.A. and the U.E.F.A. challenged the decision by appealing
for a "sporting exception" to the rule established in Bosman.9 3 The appeal
was initially rebuffed by Competition Commissioners Karel Van Miert and
Mario Monti, the latter insisting that "Article 39 of the Treaty precludes
restrictions on the number of nationals from EU Member States or from
third countries."9 4 Thus, in an effort to curb the "massive migration of
foreign players" hastened by Bosman's abolition of the three-plus-two rule,
national leagues felt pressured to find some way of maintaining the trans-
85. See id., 1995 E.C.R. at paras. 131-35, at 1-5077-78, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at paras.
131-35, at 775-76.
86. See ROGER BLANPAIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF SPORTSMEN AND SPORTSWOMEN UNDER
INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN, AND BELGIAN NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LAw 24 (2003).
87. See id. Good examples of this are the Portuguese player Figo, who signed a life-
long contract, or the Brazilian player Ronaldo, who signed a nine-year contract. See id.
88. See Murray Ritchie, Threat to UEFA over EU Rules, HERALD (Glasgow), Jan. 20,
1996, at 32.
89. Id.
90. The "three-plus-two rule" was a restriction on foreign players, limiting first divi-
sion U.E.F.A. teams to three foreign players, and up to two more players who had played
in the country for five consecutive years, including at least three with the training team.
See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at para. 27, at 1-5050, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para. 27, at 758-59
(1995).
91. See Ritchie, supra note 88, at 32.
92. See Neil McLeman, Transfer Fees To Be Scrapped for Older Players, SCOTSMAN
(Edinburgh), Mar. 2, 1998, at 25 (describing the abolition of transfer fees in the United
Kingdom as a "belated response to the 1995 Bosman ruling").
93. See BLANPAIN, supra note 86, at 31-32 ("Regulations drawn up by sports federa-
tions which lay down rules without which a sport could not exist ... should not, in
principle, be subject to the application of EC competition law. Sporting rules applied in
an objective, transparent and non-discriminatory manner do not constitute restrictions
on competition.") (quoting Competition Commissioner Mario Monti).
94. Id. at 33 (quoting Monti).
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fer system. 9 5
Teams quickly discovered such a method. The ECJ's Bosman ruling
applied only to transfer fees for players whose contracts had expired.9 6
Accordingly, teams were still able to collect transfer fees for players still
under contract.9 7 Because close to ninety percent of transfer revenue came
from in-contract transfers, the restriction of player movement for the most
part largely remained unchanged. 98
2. An Accord Is Reached
Frustrated by the lack of change in the transfer system following Bos-
man, the Competition Committee announced plans to enact a law that
would allow players to break their contracts upon one month's notice to
their clubs.99 After giving the proper notice, a player would be free to sign
with any other club by paying off the remaining value of his contract. 10 0
On July 5, 2001, F.I.F.A. adopted the new transfer regulations that had
been preapproved by the Competition Committee. 10 1 The new regulations
gave F.I.F.A. the right to bar "any player breaking his contract within the
first two years of a three-year 'protected' period ... from playing for his new
club for four months in the next season. '10 2 Despite this temporary ban,
however, the new agreement gave players some of the freedom of mobility
between teams (i.e., free agency) they had long desired.
Of course, this new plan is still being tested. FIFPro, the players
union, objected from the start to the suspension period for players break-
ing their contracts. 10 3 At the same time, owners have argued that small
clubs will be unable to remain financially stable without the possibility of
receiving the large transfer fees of the past.10 4 Both parties' worries would
only increase in the wake of still more court interference to come.
D. "Bosman Times One Million": The Influx of Foreign Players
1. Malaja v. Federation Fran~aise de Basket-Ball1 0 5
The Bosman ruling ripped apart established transfer rules for footbal-
lers in Europe by ending the system that allowed clubs to retain players
even after their contracts expired, and ending restrictions in national and
international club competitions on the numbers of non-national players
95. See Irving, supra note 41, at 687.
96. Id. at 688 (noting that "[pilayers could see that if they merely sat tight until their
contracts ran out, then they would be able to sign with the highest bidder").
97. Id. at 688-89.
98. Id.
99. See Charlie Allan, Transfer Bombshell Won't Kill Us, ABERDEEN PRESS & JOURNAL,
May 13, 2000, at 10.
100. See id.
101. See New Transfer System Set for September, CNN Sports Illustrated, at http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/soccer/news/2001/07/05/fifatransfers (July 5, 2001).
102. Id. Repeat offenders faced a six-month ban. Id.
103. Id.
104. See BLANPAIN, supra note 86, at 14.
105. Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 30, 2002, Lebon at 485.
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playing on club teams (as long as non-national players were EU nationals).
The case, however, still left a potentially devastating issue unresolved:
While it was clear that the ruling applied to all sports and not just football,
it was less obvious whether it covered only EU players, or non-EU players
as well. 106
This issue came to a head in the case of Malaja v. Federation Fran~aise
de Basket-Ball (FFBB). 10 7 Lila Malaja was a Polish basketball player who
wished to play professionally in France.1 0 8 The French club of Strasbourg
recruited her for the 1998-1999 season, but the French Federation of Bas-
ketball (F.F.B.) banned her from playing for the team because the Stras-
bourg club already employed two other foreign nationals who were not
citizens of an EU country. 10 9 Article 8 of the Rules of the F.F.B. stated that
a club could not have more than two non-EU players on its roster. 110 Ms.
Malaja-whose case was backed by the French government-claimed that,
despite being a non-EU citizen, she was still entitled to play in France, on
the strength of Poland's agreement with the European Union that guaran-
teed free passage of labor.11 '
The Conseil d'Etat held for Ms. Malaja and extended the Bosman rul-
ing to Eastern European countries that were not yet members of the Union,
but had Association Agreements with the EU. 1 1 2 The court further
expanded Bosman to cover players from countries that had special coopera-
tion agreements with the EU, including Turkey and three Northern African
countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. 1
13
The decision sparked a widespread belief that the football leagues of
the EU's first-world nations would be flooded with players from third-
world nations who would agree to work for lower wages than their team-
mates. 114 Jean-Jacques Amorfini, a member of France's players' union,
stated: "A lot of players from Eastern Europe[an] countries could be inter-
ested in joining French clubs for almost nothing. We already have enough
jobless players not to create some more."' 1 5 F.I.F.A. President Sepp Blatter
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.; Bernhard Schmeilzl, Lilia Malaja and Maros Kolpak: Unrestricted Profes-
sional Athletes Within Europe and Beyond? Current Developments and Future Perspec-
tives in the Area of Freedom of Movement in Sports 23 (2000), available at http://
www.grafpartner.com/downloads/Dissertation Final.pdf.
109. See Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 30, 2002, Lebon at 486; Schmeilzl, supra note 108, at
23-24.
110. See Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 30, 2002, Lebon at 486.
111. See id.; Schmeilzl, supra note 108, at 24.
112. See Conseil d'Etat, Dec. 30, 2002, Lebon at 487; Schmeilzl, supra note 108, at 24.
("The court argued that the Agreement set out clearly and precisely a rule for equal
treatment and forbids any discrimination provided a person was in possession of a valid
work permit and a contract.") (internal quotations omitted).
113. See Ruling Extended to 24 Countries, ESPN Soccernet, at http://soc-
cernet.espn.go.com/headlinenews?id=255345&cc=5901 (Jan. 18, 2003); Schmeilzl,
supra note 108, at 24-25.
114. French Want Additions to 'Malaja' Rule, ESPN Soccernet, at http://soc-
cernet.espn.go.com/headlinenews?id=259291&cc=5901 (Feb. 27, 2003).
115. See id.
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said the decision amounted to trouble equal to "Bosman times one million"
and predicted that the decision could be used to open European football's
doors to free movement by players from over seventy-seven developing
nations with which the EU had entered into similar agreements. 116 Malaja
thus triggered a debate over the scope of the EU's obligations under the
EEC Treaty and various Association Agreements, which the ECJ would set-
tle in Deutscher Handballbund e.V. v. Kolpak.
117
2. Deutscher Handballbund e.V. v. Kolpak
Maros Kolpak, a Slovak national, was the goalkeeper for TSV Ostr-
ingen, a German handball team that played in the German Handball Asso-
ciation ("D.H.B."). 118 D.H.B. rules prohibited teams from fielding more
than two non-EU national players on any team. 119 In February 2002,
Kolpak, citing the prohibition of discrimination set out in the Association
Agreement between the EU and Slovakia, requested that the D.H.B. allow
him to participate in the league with the same status as an EU national. 120
The league denied Kolpak this status, and Kolpak brought suit before the
ECJ.12
1
The ECJ began its decision by noting that although the relevant provi-
sion of the Association Agreement between the EU and Slovakia did not
specifically allow for free movement for Slovak workers throughout the
Community, the Association Agreement was written within the spirit of
Article 48 of the EC Treaty and should be read to include the Article's pro-
visions. 122 Thus, the Court held, Slovak workers who were already law-
fully employed in the territory of an EU Member State merited equal
treatment in regards to working conditions. 123
In response to the D.H.B.'s claims that such free access would result in
less playing time for German nationals and damage the German national
team, the ECJ referred back to Bosman.124 The Court noted that in
matches other than national team competition-the only exception to for-
eign player restrictions granted by the ECJ so far125 -all nationality clauses
affected the essence of the working rights of professional players and were
116. Thomazeau, supra note 20.
117. Deutscher Handballbund e.V., 2003 E.C.R. 1-4135.
118. Id. at para. 9, at 1-4137.
119. Id. at para. 8, at 1-4136-37.
120. See id. at para. 11, at 1-4137-38. Specifically, Kolpak objected to the D.H.B.'s
system of licensing players, which was to append the letter "A" to the license numbers of
non-EU nationals. Id. at para. 8, at 1-4136-37. A handball team could only play two
players with A designations during a given match. Id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at para. 34, at 1-4141.
123. See id. at para. 42, at 1-4145.
124. See id. at para. 54, at 1-4150.
125. See id. at para. 53, at 1-4150. Regarding the "national team" exception, the Court
reiterated Bosman's holding that this was a justifiable exclusion and distinguishable
from Kolpak's situation, because the exclusionary basis of a national team is not eco-
nomic in nature, but rather based solely on "sporting interest." See id. No other activity
fit within this narrow exception. See id.
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therefore illegal. 126
E. The Current State of Uncertainty
Today, issues of free agency, the internationalization of players, and
player transfer fees are as uncertain as ever. The long-term effects of free
agency on the game are not, at first glance, predictable. Will free agency
result in a loss of competitive balance between the teams? Will the influx
of foreign-born players reduce national interests in the game? What will
become of small market clubs who are no longer able to rely on player
transfer fees to maintain profitability? While there is certainly no clear
answer to these questions, it may be possible to predict an outcome based
on baseball's similar experiences with judicially mandated free agency and
an increasingly international player base.
I. Meanwhile, on the Other Side of the Atlantic
A. The Roots of Baseball's Reserve System
Similar to pre-Bosman Europe, American courts, for the most part,
have held American sport separate from normal business considerations,
and the government has not subjected sporting leagues' conduct to the
same scrutiny as any other ordinary business. 127 This is especially true for
baseball and even more specifically for baseball's longstanding antitrust
exemption. 128 In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 129 the United States Supreme Court created an
admitted anomaly130 in antitrust enforcement that endured for seventy-six
years until Congress struck it down by passing the Curt Flood Act of
1998.131
126. See id. at paras. 54-55, at 1-4150-51.
127. See WARREN FREEDMAN, SOCIETAL BEHAVIOR: NEw AND UNIQUE RIGHTS OF THE PER-
SON 202 (1965) ("Organized professional sports in the United States have generally
operated apart from normal business considerations as affected by the anti-trust laws.").
128. See e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 26, at 2.
129. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l League of ProflI Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922).
130. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (recognizing that baseball's anti-
trust exemption first upheld in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore was an "aberration,"
but nonetheless upholding that exemption based "on a recognition and an acceptance of
baseball's unique characteristics and needs").
131. The Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2004). Indeed, the exemption arguably
still exists in several areas of the sport, given that the Curt Flood Act guarantees baseball
players the same rights granted to other professional athletes. See id. § 26b(a). Courts
have split on the issue of whether to confine the exemption to the reserve clause only.
Compare Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Penn. 1993) (limiting
baseball's antitrust exemption to its reserve system), and Butterworth v. Nat'l League of
Profl Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994) (holding that baseball's antitrust
exemption does not extend to decisions involving sale and location of franchises), with
McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (upholding base-
ball's antitrust exemption despite players' allegations that owners engaged in unfair
labor practice during player strike), and Minnesota Twins P'ship v. State, 592 N.W.2d
847 (Minn. 1999) (holding that the proposed sale and relocation of the Minnesota Twins
Cornell International Law Journal
1. Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs 13 2
Baseball's antitrust story can be traced back to 1914 and the creation
of the Federal League, the last significant challenger to the Major Leagues'
(i.e., the National and American Leagues) control of professional base-
ball. 133 The Federal League formed as a pro-player alternative to the Major
Leagues, offering signing bonuses, higher salaries, a guaranteed five-per-
cent annual salary increase, and, most importantly, the chance to become a
free agent after ten years in the league. 13 4 The Federal League proved to be
a success and competed for players with the Major Leagues until 1915,
when the Federal League signed a "peace agreement" with the National and
American Leagues that resulted in the Major Leagues buying out the Fed-
eral League owners. 135 After the buyout, some Federal League owners
were given interests in Major League clubs. 136 Unsatisfied with the "peace
agreement," one Federal League owner, Ned Hanlon, brought an antitrust
suit in federal court against American and National League owners,13 7
who, he alleged, had conspired to monopolize the baseball business in vio-
lation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 13 s
The district court judge instructed the jury that, as a matter of law,
"appellants were engaged in interstate commerce land] that they attempted
to monopolize, and did monopolize, a part of that commerce, principally
through . . . the reserve clause" and by publishing lists of ineligible play-
ers. 13 9 The jury awarded Hanlon $80,000, which was trebled under the
provisions of the Sherman Act. 140
However, the potential victory for players' rights was short-lived. On
appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and
held that the game of baseball did not fall under the Sherman Act: "A game
of baseball is not susceptible of being transferred .... Not until [the play-
ers] come into contact with their opponents on the baseball field and the
contest opens does the game come into existence. It is local in its begin-
ning and in its end."'14 From these premises, the court held that "the
baseball team was an integral part of Major League's business and thus falls within base-
ball's antitrust exemption).
132. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. 200.
133. See ABRAms, supra note 26, at 41, 53-55. The Major Leagues themselves were an
allegiance of two former competitors, the American and National Leagues. See id. at
40-41,
134. See id. at 54.
135. See Nat'l League of Prorl Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc.,
269 F. 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1920), rev'd, 259 U.S. 200; ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 55-56.
136. See ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 56.
137. Id. The suit also named three of the Federal League owners whom Hanlon
accused of conspiring with the American and National Leagues. Id.
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2; see Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269 F. at 682.
139. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269 F. at 684, 687. When the competition was
most fierce between the Federal and Major Leagues, the Major League began blacklisting
players who had played for the Federal League, barring them from playing for any Major
League team. See RADER, supra note 13, at 113-114, 120.
140. See Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. at 208.
141. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 269 F. at 684-85.
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game affects no exchange of things according to the meaning of 'trade or
commerce."'142 The court held that the reserve clause, the published lists
of ineligible players, and other restrictive practices "relate[d] directly to the
conservation of the personnel of the clubs" and did not "directly affect the
movement ... of interstate commerce. Whatever effect, if any, they had,
was incidental, and therefore did not offend against the statute."'
143
Undeterred by his appellate court loss, Hanlon brought his suit before
the Supreme Court.144 Just as the U.E.F.A. and F.I.F.A. today couch their
arguments against antitrust in the rhetoric that sport is intrinsically differ-
ent, baseball's attorneys suggested to the Court that "the very existence of
baseball depended upon its exemption from the antitrust laws." 145 The
Court agreed, although for different reasons than the Second Circuit.
1 46
Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated:
The business is giving exhibitions of [baseball], which are purely state
affairs .... [T]he fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must
induce free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their
doing so is not enough to change the character of the business .... [T]he
transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing.
14 7
Thus, while the Second Circuit held that Major League Baseball did not
implicate federal antitrust laws because it involved no transfer of goods in
commerce, the Court held that even if such transfers did take place, they
were wholly local in nature. Holmes' reasoning would be severely criti-
cized for decades to come, 148 but it would also be upheld in the face of
several subsequent challenges in front of the Supreme Court 1 4 9 and left
unchanged by Congress until 1998.150 Thus, baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion was established and baseball's reserve system would be safe for well
over half a century. 15 1
2. The Minor League System
Originally, baseball's minor league system worked in a similar way to
that of football's international transfer system. In 1903, the same year that
the American League and the National League agreed to play the first
142. Id. at 684-85.
143. Id. at 688.
144. See ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 57.
145. .See id.
146. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., Salerno v. Am. League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003-05 (2d
Cir. 1970) ("We freely acknowledge our belief that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr.
Justice Holmes' happiest days ... and that, to use the Supreme Court's own adjectives,
the distinction between baseball and other professional sports is 'unrealistic,' 'inconsis-
tent' and 'illogical."').
149. See, e.g., Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (leaving to Congress
the burden of overturning Federal Baseball: "We think that if there are evils in this field
which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.").
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2003).
151. See ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 58-69 (discussing the "Supreme Court's incapacity
to address legal issues arising out of the national pastime").
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World Series, a collection of minor league teams created the National Asso-
ciation of Professional Baseball Leagues (N.A.P.B.L.). i5 2 The association
set up a hierarchy of minor leagues from leagues graded A through D, set
salary limits, and permitted the higher-graded leagues to draft from lower-
graded leagues for a set price. 153 The American and National Leagues
were also a party to the so-called National Agreement and agreed to grant
reserve rights to the minor league teams in exchange for the opportunity to
draft promising minor league players. 154
In 1919, however, the N.A.P.B.L. pulled out of the National Agree-
ment.1 55 Major League teams were thus unable to draft players from the
minors until 1921, when a new system was put in place requiring substan-
tially higher transfer fees, restricting the number of minor league players
that a Major League team could draft, and allowing the minor league clubs
to hold their players entirely removed from the draft system if they so
chose. 15 6 Most of the top minor league clubs did remove themselves from
the draft, instead choosing to negotiate transfer fees on a player-by-player
basis.15 7 This resulted in huge increases in the cost of player procure-
ment.15 8 Soon, the bidding wars between the large market clubs, like the
New York Yankees, to purchase the most talented players from the minors,
began to leave the smaller market clubs, like the St. Louis Cardinals, unable
to compete for top talent.15 9
Cardinals General Manager Branch Rickey, frustrated by his limited
budget and corollary inability to compete in the bidding wars, devised the
first wholly team-owned farm system.1 60 Rather than purchase players
from the independent lower-level teams, the Cardinals created their own
farm teams to compete with the other independent minor league teams. 16 1
In his farm system, Rickey set up a pyramid-type hierarchy, where the vast
majority of ballplayers would start at the lowly "D" level. 16 2 The Cardinals
directly signed each player who played their farm system, allowing the
organization to cheaply control as many players as possible and sort the
good from the bad by advancing players up the pyramid to the higher level
minor league clubs. 16 3 Once a player reached the top, or "A" level, Rickey
152. See RAOER, supra note 13, at 91.
153. See id. at 91. The minor league drafting system worked similarly to the transfer
system in European football. See discussion supra notes 4, 32-36 and accompanying
text.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 145.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 145, 147 (describing the player negotiations in the wake of the 1921
agreement).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 147.
160. Id. at 144-45, 147-48.
161. See id. at 147.
162. Id. at 148. While the Cardinals were unable to compete in the bidding wars, they
were quite able to pay any number of minor league players $300 per season, the going
rate in the depression-era minor leagues. See id.
163. Id.
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could "call him up"'1 6 4 to the Cardinals at will without paying a transfer
fee, since the Cardinals already had that player under contract. 6
Soon, the Cardinals' farm system began to reap great successes for the
Major League club. 166 Nearly all of the Cardinals' stars came from their
farm system, unencumbered by the transfer fees most Major League teams
paid when acquiring minor league players. 167 The system was so success-
ful that the Cardinals were able to "profit repeatedly" by selling excess tal-
ent to other major league teams "at premium prices."'168 Before long, the
escalating prices of minor league ballplayers and the successes of the
Cardinals farm system would force all other major league franchises to cre-
ate their own farm systems.
169
3. The Reserve System
Another mechanism that less prosperous major league clubs used to
level the playing field was the reserve system. 170 From the very beginning
of professional baseball, the majority of clubs' costs went to player sala-
ries. 171 In 1879, faced with the "immediate threat of the richer Chicago
club cornering the best players," the other National League owners
"secretly agreed that each club could 'reserve,' or hold off the market, five
players."'17 2 After many clubs saw a great reduction in player salaries,
173
both the National League and the American Association-a competing
league eventually absorbed into the National League17 4 -allowed clubs to
reserve eleven men, nearly an entire team at the time.
175
Until the mid-1970s, the reserve clause in player contracts allowed
management almost exclusive control of player salaries and their
careers. 1 76 Baseball's reserve system in many ways mirrored the restricted
mobility of pre-Bosman European football resulting from the transfer fee
system. 17 7 For example, baseball's reserve clause contained a provision
164. See id. "Call them up" is a baseball term for inviting a minor league player to join
the major league roster in mid-season. See, e.g., id. at 149 ("Even in the midst of tight
pennant races, the big league club might spoil its affiliates' chances for a flag by calling
up one or more players from their rosters.") (emphasis added).
165. Compare id. at 147-48 (discussing Rickey's efficient and cost-effective method of
bringing up players through the farm system), with id. at 144-45 (discussing the system
of player recruitment and transfer fees prior to creation of the farm system).
166. Id. at 148.
167. See id. at 145, 148.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 148-49.
170. See id. at 62-63.
171. See id. at 62 (noting that "between 1876 and 1879 the Boston club paid out
64.4% of its costs to the players").
172. Id. at 63.
173. See id. Boston, for instance, saw its salaries decline by twenty percent following
the reserve agreement. Id.
174. Id. at 70-71.
175. Id. at 63.
176. See id.
177. See Andreas Joklik, The Legal Status of Professional Athletes: Differences Between
the United States and the European Union Concerning Free Agency, 11 SpORTS LAw. J. 223,
Cornell International Law Journal
binding a player to his previous club for a year after his contract
expired. 178 This left players with two unattractive options: either accept
what the club offered them year after year, or quit baseball. 179 The reserve
clause also made it possible for clubs to buy and sell players, as was infa-
mously displayed when Boston sold Babe Ruth to the Yankees in 1918.180
After the Court's decisions in Federal Baseball181 and Toolson, 182 base-
ball's reserve system seemed as if it might be able to survive any court
challenge and would continue indefinitely. 183 The players themselves were
mostly satisfied with their salaries, usually earning two or three times as
much as an "experienced craftsman, " 184 It was not until the 1960s when,
incited by the owners' skyrocketing profits on the one hand and the adop-
tion of their generation's social consciousness on the other, players began
to revolt. 18 5
4. Flood v. Kuhn 186
In 1969, the players' frustrations with the reserve system came to a
head in the persona of Curt Flood.187 Flood was a gifted twelve-year vet-
eran outfielder in the St. Louis Cardinals organization who was coming off
an impressive two-year span of batting .366 in both 1968 and 1969 and
winning the National League Gold Glove award for fielding excellence both
years. 188 After the 1968 season, Flood requested a $30,000 raise from Car-
dinal ownership, only to be denied by owner August "Gussie" Busch, who
"privately vowed retribution." 189 The next year, Busch got his revenge by
trading Flood to the Philadelphia Phillies. 190 However, Flood refused to
253-55 (2004) (comparing the parallel paths toward free agency in the United States
and European Union).
178. Id.
179. Id.; ABRAms, supra note 26, at 118 ("An athlete had no choice but to play for the
team that reserved him, apart from not playing at all."). This, of course, left the player
with no desirable options. RADER, supra note 13, at 63. The existence of such reserve
clauses would later be the subject of the arbitration proceedings that would bring down
the reserve system. See ABRKMS, supra note 26, at 117-18, 125-27 (discussing the Mes-
sersmith decision, which abolished the reserve clause).
180. RADER, supra note 13, at 63.
181. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. 200.
182. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (1953).
183. See ABRnms, supra note 26, at 60-61 (suggesting that the Supreme Court pre-
ferred that Congress resolve baseball's antitrust disputes).
184. See RADER, supra note 13, at 63.
185. Id. at 204. "[T]he rapid escalation of professional football salaries," occurring
around the same time, was the third factor fueling baseball players' demands for
increased pay. Id.
186. Flood, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
187. See id. at 265-66 (summarizing Flood's allegation that baseball's reserve system
violated antitrust laws).
188. See Curt Flood, at http://www.baseball-reference.com/f/floodcu01.shtml (last
visited Nov. 29, 2004).
189. ABRAms, supra note 26, at 65.
190. Id.
Vol. 38
2005 The Demise of Sport?
comply with the trade and instead went to court.' 9 1 In a letter to Commis-
sioner Bowie Kuhn explaining his decision to sue Major League Baseball,
Flood wrote: "After [twelve] years in the Major Leagues, I do not feel I am a
piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes. I believe
that any system which produces that result violates my basic rights as a
citizen.' 19 2 Flood went on to request that he "be made a free agent and be
placed at liberty to strike his own bargain with any other major league
team."'193 Kuhn denied Flood's request, 194 and Flood accordingly brought
suit in the Southern District of New York, asserting in two separate federal
causes of action and two state causes of action that baseball's reserve sys-
tem was unlawful. 19 5 In his first federal cause of action, Flood asserted
that "the reserve system constitutes a conspiracy among [Major League
Baseball and its individual teams] to boycott [Flood] and to prevent him
from playing baseball other than for the Philadelphia club in violation of
the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts."'1 9 6 The second federal cause of
action asserted that "the reserve system is a form of peonage and involun-
tary servitude in violation of the anti-peonage statutes ... and the Thir-
teenth Amendment and that it deprives him of 'freedom of labor." 1 9 7
Flood based his state causes of action on state antitrust statutes and com-
mon law.19 8
The district court dismissed Flood's case, and the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal, in part because both courts believed that normal
commercial antitrust considerations did not apply to sports. 19 9 District
Court Judge Irving Cooper justified his dismissal of Flood's initial claim
for a preliminary injunction by noting:
[I]t would be unfortunate indeed if a fine sport and profession, which brings
surcease from daily travail and an escape from the ordinary to most inhabi-
tants of this land, were to suffer in the least because of undue concentration
by any one or any group on commercial and profit considerations. The
game is on higher ground; it behooves every one to keep it there."
20 0
191. See id. (noting that "Curt Flood refused to report to the Phillies" because "[a]t
age thirty-one, he did not want to move his family again, leave his business interests in
St. Louis, and finish his career playing before Philadelphia crowds that were known for
being hard on black players").
192. Id.
193. Flood, 407 U.S. at 265.
194. Id.
195. See Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 443 F.2d 264
(2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. See Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[A]s the burden on inter-
state commerce outweighs the states' interests in regulating baseball's reserve system,
the Commerce Clause precludes the application here of state antitrust law."); Flood, 316
F. Supp. at 279-80 ("[Wle believe the nationwide character of organized baseball com-
bined with the necessary interdependence of the teams requires that there by uniformity
in any regulation of baseball and its reserve system.").
200. Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (denying Flood's request
for a preliminary injunction enjoining baseball teams from refusing him employment
during the pendency of the litigation).
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The circuit court, though admitting the apparent inconsistency of its rea-
soning, held:
On the one hand, the doctrine of stare decisis binds the plaintiff because of
an initial holding that baseball is not 'interstate commerce' within the Sher-
man Act, and, on the other hand, after there have been significant changes in
the definition of 'interstate commerce,' he is now told that baseball is so
uniquely interstate commerce that state regulation cannot apply."20 1
Flood would find the Supreme Court similarly sympathetic but no
more helpful than the lower courts. In a notorious 20 2 decision, Justice
Blackmun was clearly more concerned with expressing his love for the
great American pastime than with examining the business of baseball,
which Blackmun admitted was no different than any other entertainment
business. 20 3 Blackmun began his opinion with a multiple page list of base-
ball's great players, highlights of the history of the game, and a reference to
the famous baseball poem "Casey at the Bat."20 4 Following this com-
mencement, Blackmun recounted the Supreme Court antitrust decisions
following Federal Baseball, demonstrating that baseball's antitrust exemp-
tion was, "in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. [The
Federal Baseball precedent has] become an aberration confined to base-
ball."20 5 Nonetheless, the Court held that the Federal Baseball precedent
was "an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one here-
tofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has
survived the Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce. It rests on
a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and
needs. '20 6 The Court then fully affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 20 7
5. Arbitration Brings Free Agency
After Flood, it was clear that the U.S. courts were not going to reverse
the Federal Baseball precedent. 20 8 Congress was equally ambivalent, proba-
bly worried about protecting an idealized version of the national pastime
201. Flood, 443 F.2d at 268 (citing Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, 259 U.S. at
208-09).
202. Academics wildly diverge in their opinions of Flood. See Stephen F. Ross, Recon-
sidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. MiAMi ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 169, 171 (1994/95) (noting
that "[tihose specializing in sports law have either attacked Flood as a ridiculous deci-
sion that improperly distinguished between baseball and other professional sports, or
have praised it for waging guerilla warfare on ... the Sherman Act .... Flood has also
been attacked for unjustifiably relying on legislative inaction to infer congressional
support").
203. See ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 66-67.
204. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 260-64; ABRAs, supra note 26, at 66. "Casey at the Bat" is
a famous baseball poem penned by Ernest Lawrence Thayer in 1888. Ernest L. Thayer,
Casey at the Bat, available at http://www.csh.rit.edu/-kenny/poetry/casey.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 16, 2004).
205. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 285.
208. ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 117.
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or captured by baseball's lobbyists. 20 9 However, during the collective bar-
gaining period immediately following the Flood decision, the Players Asso-
ciation (the major league players' union) had demanded and received from
the owners a dispute resolution process for airing their grievances. 210 It
was through this process that baseball's reserve system would fall. 211
In 1974, Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers won twenty
games (best in the National League) and had an earned run average (ERA)
of 2.59 (fifth best), while leading the Dodgers to the pennant. 212 After the
season, Messersmith and the Dodgers were unable to agree on the terms of
his contract, and, subject to the reserve system, the Dodgers re-signed Mes-
sersmith with a "modest salary increase. '213 In 1975, Messersmith had
another superb year, winning nineteen games, sporting an ERA of 2.29,
and leading the National League in complete games and shutouts. 214
When Messersmith was again unable to come to terms with the Dodgers,
he filed a grievance with the league, "claiming the owners' reserve system
violated the terms of the 1973 collective bargaining agreement between the
major leagues and the Players Association." 215
Messersmith claimed that under the option clause of the reserve sys-
tem, which was written into every player contract and stated that "the Club
shall have the right ... to renew this contract for the period of one year on
the same terms," a club should be limited to renewing a player's contract
one time only, not perennially. 216 The owners, meanwhile, claimed that
"each renewal ... also renewed the one-year option clause, which the club
could then renew again and again," in essence creating a perpetual
renewal.217 Messersmith further claimed that Major League Rules 4-
A(a) 218 and 3(g) 219 did not allow clubs to place players on "reserve lists" if
they were not under contract.220
After holding that the "reserve system" was an arbitrable matter, 221
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. Andy Messersmith, at http://www.baseball-reference.com/m/messean0l.shtml
(last visited Nov. 27, 2004); Andy Messersmith, at http://www.baseballlibrary.com/
baseballlibrary/ballplayers/M/MessersmithAndy.stm (last visited Nov. 27, 2004).
213. ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 118.
214. Andy Messersmith, at http://www.baseball-reference.com/m/messean01.shtml
(last visited Nov. 27, 2004).
215. In re The Twelve Clubs Comprising National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101, 102 (1976) (Seitz, Arb.); ABRAMs, supra note 26, at
118.
216. ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 118-19.
217. Id.
218. Major League Rule 4-A(a) "established club reserve lists and strongly suggested
that a player could be placed on a reserve list only if he was under contract." Id. at 126.
219. Major League Rule 3(g) "prohibited tampering and seemed to afford protection
to a club for any player reserved, even if he was not under contract." Id.
220. See id. at 125.
221. In re Twelve Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA), at 110 ("I find nothing in [the] Basic
Agreement ... to exclude a dispute as to the interpretation or application of . . . the
Reserve System from the reach of the broad grievance and arbitration provisions in Arti-
cle X [of the collective bargaining agreement].").
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Peter Seitz (the appointed arbitrator) ruled that the one-year option could
not be read as creating a perpetual option.2 22 In contrast to the Supreme
Court's deference to the glory of the game in Flood, "Seitz emphasized that
his job was to read and interpret the contract, not to decide what would be
the best system for baseball."2 23 He held that in order to have created the
perpetual renewal option advocated by the owners, the contract would have
had to include "clear and explicit" language establishing such an option. 2 24
Seitz then reached the issue of whether a team could reserve a player
whose contract had expired.2 25 Seitz interpreted the rules by using a
clause from the Cincinnati Peace Compact of the National and American
Leagues, which stated, "A reserve rule shall be recognized, by which each
and every club may reserve players under contract, and that a uniform con-
tract for the use of each league shall be adopted. '22 6 Seitz used this lan-
guage, along with prevailing New York precedent that disfavored perpetual
contracts, to interpret the Major League Rules as requiring the existence of
specific contractual terms-rather than a standard irrevocable option-
before a team could reserve a player. 22 7 Seitz thus granted Messersmith's
grievance and held that players could not be involuntarily bound by the
reserve system.2 28
The owners sought to overturn the Messersmith decision by bringing
suit to vacate the arbitration award in federal court.2 29 The owners argued
that Seitz had erred in reading the contract. 230 But the court upheld the
arbitration decision, and what had previously been an arbitration award
limited only to Messersmith became binding legal precedent for all of the
Major League Baseball Players Association. 23 1 Baseball's reserve system
was dead.232
6. The Effects of Free Agency on Major League Baseball
Similar to the current objections to free agency in European foot-
ball,23 3 baseball's owners have argued strongly for decades-ever since
Messersmith, in fact-that "free agency [leads] to league domination by
teams with the largest markets, destroying [the] competitive balance" of the
222. ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 125.
223. Id.
224. Id.; In re Twelve Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA), at 113 ("There is nothing in
Section 10(a) [of the Players Contract] which, explicitly, expresses agreement that the
Players Contract can be renewed for any period beyond the first renewal year").
225. ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 125.
226. Id. at 126; In re Twelve Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA), at 116.
227. ABRAMS, supra note 26, at 126.
228. Id.
229. See Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
230. See id. at 619; ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 127.
231. See Kansas City Royals, 532 F.2d at 632; ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 127 (calling
the owners' decision to appeal the arbitration decision "a strategic error").
232. See ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 128-33.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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game. 234 Indeed, even the fans have shared such worries, going so far as to
say that free agency threatens the "very essence of sport."235 The basic
argument is that in a free market for player services, rich teams from large
markets would dominate the market for the most talented players, leaving
the less wealthy small market clubs to field their teams from a pool of less
desirable players. 236 The resulting uncompetitive baseball games would
diminish attendance and revenues across the board-even in the dominant
markets, where fans would quickly tire of lopsided scores and uncontested
pennant races.
23 7
However, such destruction has not befallen baseball since the Messer-
smith arbitration. Indeed, this prediction defies general economic and sta-
tistical reason. 238  Using econometric and statistical regressions,
economists have isolated the effects of the free agent market on competitive
balance and found that, contrary to popular belief, free agency has left the
competitive balance, measured by the standard deviation of teams' winning
percentages over time, mostly unchanged.239 The results of these eco-
nomic studies can be verified by a casual fan's "common sense" examina-
tion.240 Under the reserve system, baseball had a history of dynastic
clubs-Baltimore and Boston in the 1890s, the New York Yankees through
much of the twentieth century, and the St. Louis Cardinals from the 1920s
through the 1940S. 24 1 Meanwhile, there have been "perennial losers," for
example, the Chicago Cubs since 1907, the Cleveland Indians since 1948,
and, until quite recently, the Boston Red Sox. 2 42 Yet immediately following
the adoption of free agency, "in the decade between 1978 and 1987, ten
different teams won the World Series."243 Especially recently, with the
resurgence of small market clubs such as the Oakland Athletics, the Minne-
sota Twins, and the Kansas City Royals, the argument in favor of free
234. Fishman, supra note 30, at 4; see ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 50-51.
235. See Frank Deford, Small Minds Destroy Small Markets, CNN Sports Illustrated, at
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/insidegame/deford/990609 (June 6, 1999).
236. See ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 51.
237. See id.
238. See Fishman, supra note 30, at 4. As Fishman argues, the Coase theory holds
that "in the absence of transaction costs and other economic distortions, the bargaining
process will produce the same outcome regardless of how property rights are originally
allocated. Under the Coasian argument, a player would end up on the team where his
marginal revenue product [was] greatest," regardless of whether the reserve clause or
free agency was in effect. Id. The systems would only differ in who benefited more-the
owners or the players. See id. Under free agency, the players would receive more of their
surplus value, while the reserve system would allocate the surplus to the owners. See id.
In the face of this reasoning, it becomes obvious why the owners have historically been
so against free agency; the system will commandeer much of their economic rents. See
id.
239. See Fishman, supra note 30, at 7-12.
240. See ABRAMs, supra note 26, at 51.
241. Id.
242. Id. Characterizing these teams as "perennial losers" is to say that they have not
won the World Series since the date in question.
243. Id.
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agency grows stronger. 244
The other common worry about free agency is that it destroys roster
stability and therefore a fan's allegiance to her team. 24 5 However, while
studies show that free agency has increased roster volatility, there have not
been corresponding declines in baseball attendance. 2 46 Instead, it appears
that the increased chance of a fan's favorite team miraculously "turning it
around" by signing the right free agents is at least as likely to boost interest
as the "revolving door" of players is likely to sap her enthusiasm.
B. Coming to America: The Internationalization of Baseball
1. The Players, the Countries, and the Marketing
Like football, baseball can be said to be a truly international game. In
2002, twenty-five percent of Major League Baseball players were born
outside of the United States. 2 4 7 Players' places of birth range from tradi-
tional baseball hotbeds, such as the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Ven-
ezuela, and Cuba, to seemingly unlikely origins, such as Spain, Belgium,
the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Great Britain. 248 The influx and
popularity of Japanese players is at an all-time high.249 During the 1990s,
the percentage of Latinos in the big leagues doubled from twelve to twenty-
four percent. 25 0 Perhaps even more importantly, foreign-born players have
become stars. Japanese outfielder Ichiro Suzuki led the major leagues in
fan votes electing him to play in the Major League Baseball All-Star Game
every year from 2001 through 2003.251 Three of the most coveted free
agents of the 2003 off-season were all born outside of the United States. 25 2
Baseball has even begun "promoting foreign-born major leaguers to
244. See generally MICHAEL LEwis, MONEYBALL 119-29, 269-74 (2003) (summarizing
the tactics used by small market clubs to remain competitive).
245. See ABAsS, supra note 26, at 52. The inference is that fans grow attached to
certain players and that when the product on the field-the team-changes too often, the
fans' allegiances will decline and so will their enthusiasm towards attending games. See
id.
246. See Tomasch, supra note 29 (demonstrating that both gross and per game base-
ball attendance is, in general, higher today than in 1975, when free agency first began).
247. University of Central Florida Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport, 2003
Racial and Gender Report Card 15, available at http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/public/
downloads/media/ides/release_05.pdf [hereinafter Report Card].
248. William B. Gould IV, Baseball and Globalization: The Game Played and Heard and
Watched 'Round the World (With Apologies to Soccer and Bobby Thomson), 8 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 85, 86 (2000/01).
249. See id.; infra notes 251 & 255 and accompanying text.
250. RADER, supra note 13, at 252. See also Report Card, supra note 247, at 14 tbl. 1
(showing that in the 1990s, the percentage of Latinos in the big leagues rose from thir-
teen to twenty-six percent).
251. See Bob Sherwin, All-Star Voters Give Mariners High-Five, SEA-rrLE TIMES, July 7,
2003, at DI.
252. See Top 50 Free Agents, ESPN, at http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/
story?page=top50freeagents (Nov. 10, 2003) (ranking Vladimir Guerrero, Bartolo Col6n,
and Miguel Tejada as its top three free agents). Guerrero, Col6n, and Tejada are all
natives of the Dominican Republic. Kevin Modesti, World's Series: Baseball Cup Would Be
Ultimate Hot-Stove Topic, DAILY NEws (Los Angeles), Mar. 30, 2004, at S1 (Valley ed.).
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their home countries" in an effort to build overseas markets. 253 "The result
has been an intense [growth in popularity] in the [nineteen] countries with
players currently on big-league rosters. '254 For instance, at the May 7,
2003 Yankees -Mariners game in Seattle, over 150 members of the Japanese
press showed up to cover the matchup pitting Japanese superstars Hideki
Matsui against Ichiro Suzuki. 255 In addition to media coverage, baseball
has also expanded the playing field in terms of the nature of the opposition
and the location of its games. In 1999, the Baltimore Orioles "split a two-
game set with the Cuban national team" in otherwise forbidden Havana. 256
Opening day baseball games have been played from Monterrey, Mexico to
Tokyo, Japan. 257 Finally, in 2003 the Montreal Expos played twenty-two
games in Puerto Rico, their "second home. 258
2. The Effects of Internationalization
As a result of the increasing internationalization, baseball has seen its
market skyrocket abroad.25 9 In 2003, every New York Yankees game and
most Seattle Mariners games were broadcast in Japan.260 The Los Angeles
Dodgers, California Angels, San Diego Padres, Texas Rangers, and Florida
Marlins began the ever-increasing trend of broadcasting their games in
Spanish. 261 Major League Baseball broadcast its Spanish-language play-by-
play of the 2003 Playoffs and All-Star Game nationally. 262 Finally, the San
Diego Padres most innovatively used the game's international popularity to
expand their fan base by chartering buses to bring fans from Tijuana, Mex-
ico to their Sunday games.263
Baseball has suffered no discernible backlash from fans at home.
Since 1990, when baseball's international player population began increas-
ing rapidly,264 attendance increased,265 despite rising ticket prices and a
devastating 1994 player strike that resulted in the cancellation of the World
253. Gould, supra note 248, at 88 (quoting Anthony Bianco, A Grand Slam Season,
Bus. WEEK (New York), Nov. 2, 1998, at 104).
254. Id.
255. See Bradley Meacham, Japanese Media Pressed Together, SEATTLE TIMES, May 9,
2003, at D7.
256. Gould, supra note 248, at 88; see Murray Chass, High-Priced Orioles Humiliated
by Cubans, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1999, at D3.
257. Gould, supra note 248, at 89; see Nicholas Dawidoff, The International Pastime?,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at A27.
258. Bob Sherwin, Expos Trippin'from Coast to Coast, SEATrLE TIMES, June 11, 2003, at
D10.
259. See RADER, supra note 13, at 254.
260. See Larry Stone, Ichiro, Matsui Faceoff Creates Frenzy Among Japanese Fans, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at Dl.
261. RADER, supra note 13, at 254.
262. Mary Sutter, ABC Radio, ESPN Pitching Spanish Baseball Broadcasts, DAILY VARI-
mE (Los Angeles), July 14, 2003, at 30.
263. RADER, supra note 13, at 254.
264. Id. at 252-55.
265. See Tomasch, supra note 29.
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Series.2 66 In 1990, the average attendance at Major League Baseball games
was 26,045 per game.2 67 Last season, in 2004, that number had increased
to 30,401, the third-highest average in history and eight percent higher
than the 2003 total.268 The internationalization of baseball has not ruined
the American pastime.26 9 People have not lost interest in watching the
game just because a larger number of foreign players are playing it; Rather,
globalization has increased the game's popularity both in America and
abroad. 2 70
111. From the American Pastime to the World's Pastime
The football world has several worries following Bosman, Malaja, and
Kolpak. It is concerned (1) that the decisions and the rules following will
make it impossible to field a team representative of the local population
and thus will decrease fan interest in the game, (2) that the accompanying
influx of foreign players will make it more difficult for nations to develop a
local pool of talent from which a national team can be selected, (3) that the
end of the reserve system will make it impossible to maintain a competitive
balance between the clubs, 2 7 1 and (4) that the end of mandatory transfer
fees will make it impossible to maintain lower-level developmental
teams.2 72 However, by examining the similar struggles encountered in
baseball, it is possible to predict that these worries are largely unfounded.
The developments in baseball leading to the modern, free agent era
and the ensuing struggles are remarkably similar to developments and
struggles of European football. For example, in both sports, players began
the revolution when they were forced by owners to take less pay than their
fair market value and then threatened with being traded or transferred
against their will. For example, when Jean-Marc Bosman refused a seventy-
five percent pay cut from RC Liege in 1990, he echoed the frustrations of
Curt Flood's refusal to accept a lesser salary from the St. Louis Cardinals in
1969.273 Both players attempted to bring about change through their
266. See Eric Fisher, HRs, New Parks Spark Attendance, WASH. TiMES, May 10, 2000, at
BI ("Baseball's recovery process from the 1994-95 players' strike is nearing comple-
tion.... [T]he game has made a slow climb back toward the record levels of 1993 [to]
94. There was a small step backward last year, but that was attributed to fast-climbing
ticket prices.").
267. See Tomasch, supra note 29.
268. Baseball Sets Record for Total Attendance with Third-Highest Average, supra note
29.
269. Leonard Koppett, The Globalization of Baseball: Reflections of a Sports Writer, 8
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 81, 81-84 (2000).
270. See, e.g., David Beard, Latin Flavor Blossoms in Baseball, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lau-
derdale), Oct. 30, 1997, at 1A (discussing the Marlins' international lineup's ability to
attract fans).
271. See supra Parts I.C-D.
272. See Martin Wood, They Think It's All Over- It May Well Be; Report Finds Small
Clubs Under Threat as Millions Dribble Past, BIRMINGHAM POST, Aug. 7, 1998, at 22.
273. Compare Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. at para. 34, at 1-5051, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. at para.
34, at 759, with Flood, 407 U.S. 258, 264-65.
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respective country's competition laws, 2 7 4 but in both cases it took several
years.2 75 Given the similar development of the free agency system in both
football and baseball, there is every reason to believe that football will
adapt successfully, just as baseball did.
A. National Pastimes? The Effects of Foreign Players on Domestic
Popularity
The Malaja and Kolpak decisions have had their predicted effect: They
triggered an influx of non-national players playing in Europe's top
leagues. 2 76 For example, in 2003, the English premier division-the F.A.
Premier League-began its season with only eighty-six English players in
the League's twenty starting lineups.2 77 Thus, foreign-born starters num-
bered 134.278
But this is no reason to predict that the popularity of the game will
decline. Baseball experienced a similar influx of foreign-born players in
the 1990s: By 2003, twenty-six percent of major leaguers and nearly fifty
percent of minor leaguers were foreign born, yet baseball did not experi-
ence anything like the decline in popularity predicted in football; indeed
game attendance increased.2 79 Further, the success of foreign players in
Europe mirrors the success of foreign players in the United States. For
instance, of the fifty players nominated for this year's Golden Ball Award
(which is awarded to the European footballer of the year), ten were born
outside of Europe.28 0 Such star player power has proven valuable for base-
ball not only through increasing popularity nationally but also by increas-
ing market size abroad.2 8 1 Attendance records in the United States have
not dropped as predicted in Europe; rather, attendance is up seventeen per-
cent since baseball began to internationalize in earnest in 1990.282
Attendance, however, is not the European football fans' only concern;
they also worry that the influx of foreign players will thwart the develop-
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ment of local talent to stock their national teams for World Cup play.2 83
Here, we cannot predict so confidently from the experiences of baseball
that such fears are unfounded. Since the early 1990s (when Latin Ameri-
cans began to take up substantial shares of Major League rosters) Ameri-
cans' participation in baseball youth leagues has declined significantly.
2 84
But while participation may have declined, the quality of American base-
ball may have risen. For example, the United States won its first-ever
Olympic gold medal in baseball when Ben Sheets pitched a shutout in the
gold-medal game against Cuba at the Sydney Olympics in 2000.285 How-
ever, with only two European teams in the final four at the 2002 World
Cup,28 6 perhaps this is a valid European gripe.
B. Will Free Agency Destroy Europe's Developmental Leagues?
It is a widespread belief in Europe that F.I.F.A.'s modification of the
transfer system following the Bosman decision will lead to the eventual end
of the small market (or developmental) football clubs because these clubs
will be unable to support themselves financially without transfer fee reve-
nue.2 8 7 While an examination of small club finances is beyond the scope
of this Note, baseball's own adaptation to the same problem may again
provide a possible solution. The "farm system" devised by Branch Rickey
has provided baseball with an organized developmental system while at the
same time saving hundreds of small clubs throughout the country.2 88 It is
not hard to imagine a similar system in Europe. Established first-division
football clubs2 8 9 would become affiliated with a group of small market
clubs, stock those teams with their developmental players, and provide
them with financial support.2 90 When the St. Louis Cardinals first imple-
mented such a system, it was so successful as to alter the competitive bal-
ance in baseball. 2 9 1 It is not too far-fetched that a farm system in Europe
might enjoy similar success.
One problem with implementing a "feeder" system in football would
be the elimination of the excitement traditionally inherent in football cham-
283. See Thomazeau, supra note 20 (discussing fears that after the Bosman ruling,
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pionships, such as the F.A. Cup and Worthington Cup. 2 9 2 Many European
nations, for example, England, hold national championship tournaments
open to clubs at all levels. 29 3 Some of the excitement from such competi-
tions is built around upsets by small clubs over their larger, wealthier coun-
terparts. 2 94 There is some argument that a farm system would change the
nature of such competitions, given that the first-division club would likely
have already brought up all the top players.2 9 5 But this argument ignores
the fact that even with the transfer system in place, first-division clubs
already control most of the top players. In reality, the farm system would
change very little in the disproportionate talent imbalance inherent in these
open tournaments.
C. The New York Yankees/Manchester United Effect-Maintaining
Competitive Balance in Sport
Sports enthusiasts, players, and owners worldwide have long recog-
nized that competitive balance is an essential characteristic to the success
of professional sports. 29 6 With uneven competition, game outcomes
become predictable, leaving less incentive for players to perform and less
uncertainty for fans to enjoy. Unfortunately, in professional sports, the
problem of maintaining competitive balance is a complex one, full of inher-
ent problems.2 97 Sport, at its heart, has become a business. Players have
gone from being part-time competitors supplementing their "day job" to
being full-time millionaires. Within this change lies the debate that
sparked the court cases outlined above. How do business and sport inter-
act? Competition has unique meanings in business, law and sport. At
what level do we allow the freedoms allowed businesses to shape sport?
How much must we sacrifice competitive balance for these freedoms?
The similarities of American baseball's and European football's strug-
gle with this tradeoff are remarkable. The arguments against free agency
are the same: A free market for player services will allow rich teams from
large markets to hoard the most talented players by outbidding the compe-
tition, resulting in a loss of competitive balance.29 8 But such reasoning
flies in the face of conventional economic reasoning and cannot be sup-
ported with anecdotal evidence. 2 99 Instead, free agency in baseball has
actually created a more competitive environment, as evidenced by the
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decrease in the standard deviation of winning percentages during the free
agent era.300
Admittedly, when a sports fan thinks about competitive balance, she
probably is not worried about the standard deviation of winning percent-
ages; she is worried about championships. Even in this regard, free agency
has not caused a reduction in competitive balance. For one thing, in the
twenty-six World Series that have occurred in the free agent era, eighteen
different teams have emerged victorious. 301 Further, one need only con-
trast the experience of the Chicago Cubs (Chicago, of course, being one of
the largest markets in the United States), which has not won a single World
Series in the free agent era, with that of the Oakland Athletics or the Minne-
sota Twins (two of the smallest markets with baseball franchises), 30 2 which
have combined for three World Series rings, to see that small market teams
are capable of competing even in the free agent era.30 3 While cultural dif-
ferences between the United States and Europe admittedly may have some
effect, it is unlikely that cultural differences would cause Europe's experi-
ence with free agency to buck modern economic and anecdotal trends.
Conclusion
Jean-Marc Bosman and Curt Flood filed antitrust lawsuits that would
change the very nature of two of the most popular sports on earth. The
fallout following these lawsuits transferred enormous amounts of wealth
from owners to players, created entirely new systems of organizing sporting
clubs, and caused fans to worry that the very nature of these sports would
be destroyed. The remarkable thing is that the two sporting communities,
separated by the Atlantic Ocean, have had experiences that were almost
identical.
While Europe wonders what the final effect of Bosman's suit will be,
one can safely say that the changes in baseball following Flood's suit have
been for the better. Attendance has increased, the competitive balance has
increased, and the game has expanded into new international markets.
Europe fears that the Bosman, Malaja, and Kolpak decisions have
begun a process that will result in the destruction of their beloved pastime.
These worries appear to be valid on their face, but the similar experiences
of baseball and football seem to suggest otherwise. It appears that fans are
more concerned with the quality of the team on the field than a player's
individual, ethnic makeup. Further, this is one case where economic pre-
dictions have become true: Free agency has increased the competitive bal-
ance on the field, not restricted it.
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Of course, some of Europe's worries do appear to be valid. A correla-
tion can be made linking the increase of foreign players and a decline in the
interest and quality of a country's national players. Further, while baseball
and football have developed similarly up until this point, there is certainly
no guarantee that these similarities will continue. It may very well be that
because of the differences between the cultural and social makeup of
Europe and the United States, Europe's sporting industry will have a mark-
edly different reaction to free agency. But these types of differences are
impossible to predict ex ante. We can only look backwards and comfort
European football fans that these cultural and social differences have had
little effect to date.

